# Permissions boundary

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

An AWS IAM feature that sets the maximum permissions an identity-based policy can grant to one IAM user or role. The entity can do only what both the boundary and its identity policies allow. A boundary alone grants nothing. Think of it as a ceiling.

## An example, sourced

AWS documents a user named Shirley who should manage only Amazon S3, Amazon CloudWatch and Amazon EC2. A boundary allows s3:*, cloudwatch:* and ec2:*. When a second policy allowing iam:CreateUser is attached, creating a user fails, because the boundary does not allow the action. Shirley can never act in IAM through that user. AWS also documents using a boundary to delegate user creation, and warns that a NotPrincipal Deny in a resource policy denies every principal carrying a boundary.

## Why it matters here

Boundaries make it safe to let someone create identities, because the new identities cannot exceed the boundary. They apply per identity, so they do not replace an SCP baseline. The same cap can also be set on roles, which makes them fit for pipelines and automation that create other roles. Test each one before use.

## Related pages

- [Explicit deny: meaning and an example](/glossary/explicit-deny/)
- [Implicit deny: meaning and an example](/glossary/implicit-deny/)
- [Organizational unit: meaning and an example](/glossary/organizational-unit/)
- [All of them](/glossary/)

## Sources

- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/glossary/permissions-boundary/
