# AWS SCP examples are mostly deny lists with one named exception, and each one breaks something specific

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

The library holds 27 service control policy entries from AWS documentation and the AWS sample repository. They fall into six jobs, from protecting the organization to constraining Bedrock. This guide names what each pattern blocks, what it breaks in a live account, and which ones carry no exception at all.

## The 27 SCP entries sort into six jobs

The AWS sample repository groups its service control policies by purpose, and the library keeps that grouping. Every entry on the [SCP mechanism page](/mechanisms/scp/) states the exact actions it denies and a documented side effect. The table below picks one entry per job. AWS documents SCPs as available only in an organization that has all features enabled, so an organization using only consolidated billing cannot use any of them.

Counting the entries is a good first check on a proposed rollout. A team that wants "the standard SCPs" usually means three or four of these, not all 27, and the sections below show why the others are optional. The count is also a reminder that SCPs compete for limited space: each root, OU and account takes at most 10 attached SCPs, and each policy document is capped at 10,240 characters.

| Job | Example entry | What it blocks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Protect the organization | [Deny member accounts leaving the organization](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-leave-org/) | organizations:LeaveOrganization |
| Contain root and IAM | [Deny critical IAM user actions](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-critical-iam-user-actions/) | Creating IAM users, access keys and login profiles |
| Keep logging and detection on | [Deny disabling or modifying Amazon GuardDuty](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-guardduty-changes/) | Disabling detectors, changing filters and members |
| Protect data and keys | [Deny KMS key deletion](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-kms-key-deletion/) | Scheduling key deletion, deleting aliases |
| Limit where and what | [Deny access outside approved Regions](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-unapproved-regions/) | Every action outside the approved Regions |
| Constrain AI services | [Allow only approved Amazon Bedrock models](/guardrails/aws-scp-bedrock-approved-models-only/) | Invoking models outside the approved pattern |

## Most examples deny an action unless a privileged role is calling

The common shape is a Deny statement with a condition that exempts one named role. [Deny critical IAM user actions](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-critical-iam-user-actions/) stops everyone except a privileged role or a tagged exception from creating IAM users and access keys. [Deny billing, tax and account contact changes](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-billing-and-contact-changes/) works the same way. AWS documents the same shape in its own example, which combines an allow of selected services with a Deny on organizations:LeaveOrganization in one policy.

That shape moves the question from "who may do this" to "who owns the privileged role". The policy text carries a placeholder, [PRIVILEGED_ROLE], that the sample repository leaves for you to fill in. A policy applied with the placeholder unreplaced exempts nobody, so check the role name before attaching it to anything. Ask who holds that role, how its use is logged, and what happens when its credentials leak.

## A few examples carry no exception, so they apply to everyone

Three entries have no exception condition: [Deny member accounts leaving the organization](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-leave-org/), [Deny deleting VPC flow logs](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-vpc-flow-log-deletion/) and [Enforce a 30-day KMS key deletion window](/guardrails/aws-scp-kms-30-day-deletion-window/). AWS documents that SCPs affect all users and roles in attached accounts, including the root user, so these bind the account administrator too. These are the entries to review with account owners first, because nothing in the policy gives them a way around the rule.

The side effect is practical. Cleanup automation that deletes flow logs fails. A deletion scheduled with a pending window under 30 days fails. Neither shows up in a code review of the policy, which is why the library lists the breakage next to the policy and not only the intent. A fix means editing or detaching the SCP, so write down the failure mode in the change request before the attachment, not after the first ticket.

## Each pattern breaks something you can name in advance

The Region deny lists approved Regions and exempts global services through a NotAction list. The README warns the example may not include every current global service, so a newly launched global service can fail until you add it. [Require server-side encryption on S3 uploads](/guardrails/aws-scp-require-s3-server-side-encryption/) fails any upload that omits the encryption header, for every principal. Neither failure is visible from the policy name alone, and each appears only when a deployment hits it.

The detection-service entries are quieter. [Deny disabling or modifying Amazon GuardDuty](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-guardduty-changes/) includes guardduty:ArchiveFindings and guardduty:CreateFilter, so analysts handling findings need the privileged role as well. [Deny enabling and disabling AWS Config](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-config-changes/) blocks teams from adding their own Config rules. The Config entry has a further wrinkle: its README notes that AWS Control Tower already applies a similar default control, so the SCP may repeat a protection you already have.

## Treat the sample policies as drafts and test them in one OU first

AWS states that it strongly recommends against attaching SCPs to the organization root without thorough testing, and suggests an OU that accounts move into one at a time. The sample repository is licensed MIT-0, so you can copy and edit the policies, and several need edits: placeholder trail names, Region lists, approved model identifiers. Plan for those edits before the review meeting, not during it.

Use [how SCP evaluation works](/guides/how-scp-evaluation-works/) to predict the effect of stacking two of these across OU levels, and [testing a guardrail before you apply it](/guides/testing-a-guardrail-before-you-apply-it/) for the checks to run first. The entries themselves are listed under [the library](/library/) with the full JSON. Each entry page shows the full policy, the source file in the AWS repository and the documented side effect, so a reviewer can compare the text with the claim.

## Related pages

- [How SCP evaluation works: allow lists, deny lists, and the limits](/guides/how-scp-evaluation-works/)
- [Resource control policies: what RCPs are and how they differ from SCPs](/guides/resource-control-policies/)
- [Permissions boundaries: capping IAM users and roles, and delegation](/guides/permissions-boundaries/)
- [All of them](/guides/)

## Sources

- AWS Organizations: Service control policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- AWS Organizations: SCP evaluation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps_evaluation.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- AWS Organizations: Service control policy examples: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps_examples.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- AWS samples: service-control-policy-examples README: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aws-samples/service-control-policy-examples/main/README.md (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/guides/aws-scp-examples-explained/
