An SCP never grants access, an allow must exist at every level, and a deny at any level wins
Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
AWS documents SCP evaluation as deny by default for allow statements and deny wins at any level of the path from the organization root to the account. This guide covers allow lists, deny lists, inheritance through OUs, what SCPs never touch, and the documented size and attachment limits.
An SCP sets a maximum and grants nothing
AWS describes a service control policy as a permission guardrail that sets limits on what IAM users and roles in an organization can do. No permission is granted by an SCP. The effective permissions are the intersection of what the SCPs and resource control policies allow and what the identity-based and resource-based policies allow. Both sides must allow an action before it succeeds, and either side can stop it.
A user with no identity policy has no access even when every SCP allows everything. If a permissions boundary is also present, AWS documents that the boundary, the SCP and the identity-based policy must all allow the action. See permissions boundaries for the boundary side. So a boundary adds a third condition to the same intersection. Plan each new SCP with the identity policies and boundaries it will meet in mind, not in isolation.
Allow statements are needed at every level of the path
For a permission to be allowed in an account, AWS documents that an explicit Allow must exist at every level from the root through each OU on the path to the account, including the account itself. That is why enabling SCPs attaches the AWS managed policy FullAWSAccess to every root, OU and account. Figures 1 and 2 on the AWS page show Account B losing access when the Production OU lacks the allow.
If FullAWSAccess is removed at a level and not replaced, everything beneath that level is blocked. AWS says not to remove it unless you replace it with a policy that allows actions, otherwise all actions from member accounts fail. An allow list replaces FullAWSAccess with a policy naming permitted services, at the root or at each OU. AWS repeats the warning in its guidance on testing SCPs, which is worth reading before any edit to the root.
A deny at any level cannot be overridden below it
For a deny, any SCP on the path can block the permission. AWS gives the example of a deny attached to a Production OU for one service, with allows for the same service at the root and at the account: the account is still denied. Scenario 6 in the AWS page repeats the point at the root: an S3 deny at the root beats an S3 allow in a child OU. Treat a deny as fixed for the OU where it is attached, and grant exceptions through a condition inside the deny, not through an allow lower down.
This is why deny lists are the easier pattern to reason about. Each deny holds wherever it is attached, and a deny-only SCP at the root with no allow statement blocks every service, so keep FullAWSAccess in place when you add denies. AWS also notes that relying only on allow statements can lead to unintended access, because broader or overlapping allows can override narrower ones. Writing denies as narrow conditions inside one statement keeps that review short.
Some principals and tasks are outside SCP reach
SCPs do not affect users or roles in the management account, and they do not affect any service-linked role. They apply to member accounts that are designated as delegated administrators. They also do not affect resource-based policies directly or principals from accounts outside the organization: a bucket policy that grants an outside account is not limited by the bucket owner account SCP. A control that must hold for the management account's own users needs a different mechanism.
AWS lists further tasks SCPs cannot restrict, such as registering for the Enterprise support plan as the root user and providing trusted signer functionality for CloudFront private content. The gap for outside principals is what resource control policies were added to cover. Those exclusions explain why each library entry says what it does not cover. Read the section on tasks and entities not restricted by SCPs before you promise coverage to an auditor.
The documented limits shape how you layer policies
An SCP document can be up to 10,240 characters, and the sizes count white space. Each root, OU and account can have at most 10 SCPs attached directly, every entity must keep at least one, and OUs can nest five levels deep under a root. AWS documents these as hard limits. AWS states that all policy limits are hard limits, so there is no quota request to file.
Inherited policies do not count against the attachment limit, so many small policies near the top and few at the bottom stay within it. If you disable the SCP policy type in a root, every SCP is detached from every entity, and the attachments are lost and not automatically recoverable. Keep the policy JSON in version control so the state can be rebuilt.
Related pages
Sources
- AWS Organizations: SCP evaluation, read 10 Nov 2026
- AWS Organizations: Service control policies, read 10 Nov 2026
- AWS Organizations: Quotas and service limits, read 10 Nov 2026
- IAM: Permissions boundaries, read 10 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.