# A permissions boundary caps what an identity policy can grant and makes delegation safe to hand out

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

AWS documents a permissions boundary as a managed policy that sets the maximum permissions an identity-based policy can grant to one IAM user or role. This guide covers how boundaries combine with identity policies and SCPs, the resource-based policy exceptions, and the delegated user creation pattern in the library.

## A boundary caps one user or role and grants nothing

A permissions boundary is a managed policy, AWS managed or customer managed, set on one IAM user or role. The entity can perform only the actions allowed by both its identity-based policies and its boundary. The boundary alone grants nothing. The managed policy can be an AWS managed policy or a customer managed policy. It is set per entity, so each user or role that needs the cap must carry it, and an identity without a boundary has none.

AWS gives a user named Shirley a boundary that allows s3:*, cloudwatch:* and ec2:*. A separate policy allowing iam:CreateUser fails, because the boundary does not allow the action. The library keeps this as [Permissions boundary limiting a user to S3, CloudWatch and EC2](/guardrails/aws-pb-restrict-user-to-s3-cloudwatch-ec2/). AWS adds that, given those two policies, Shirley has no permission to perform any operation in AWS until a permissions policy allows actions in other services.

## Boundaries, SCPs and identity policies must all agree

Within an account, AWS lists identity-based policies, resource-based policies, permissions boundaries, Organizations SCPs and session policies as the policy types that affect effective permissions. If any one of them explicitly denies an operation, the request is denied. When a boundary and an SCP are both present, the boundary, the SCP and the identity-based policy must all allow the action. Check all of those layers before you decide that an access failure is a missing grant.

The scopes differ. An SCP caps every principal in an account or OU, which suits a baseline. A boundary caps one identity, which suits a person or role that is allowed to create other identities. For the organization-wide rules, see [how SCP evaluation works](/guides/how-scp-evaluation-works/). A tight boundary on a role that already sits under an SCP is therefore redundant for the actions the SCP blocks, but it still protects the identity if the role moves to an account with a looser SCP.

## Resource-based policies can bypass a boundary in documented cases

Within the same account, a resource-based policy that grants permissions to an IAM user ARN is not limited by an implicit deny in the user identity-based policy or boundary. A grant to a role session ARN, or to an AWS STS federated user session, goes directly to the session and is not limited by the boundary either. A grant to the role ARN itself is limited by the boundary.

AWS also warns against a NotPrincipal element with a Deny effect on resources used by identities that have a boundary: it denies every principal that has a boundary attached. The recommendation is the ArnNotEquals condition with aws:PrincipalArn. Rewrite any such statement before you add boundaries to the identities it covers; the failure otherwise shows up as lost access for principals that looked allowed in review.

## Delegation is the strongest use

AWS describes a boundary as the way to let an IAM user create other users inside limits. In its example, an administrator lets a colleague create users, on the condition that those users cannot manage IAM, cannot reach a logs bucket and an instance, and cannot remove their own boundary. The boundary therefore does the delegating work that an SCP cannot do for a single person.

The library entry is [Permissions boundary for delegated IAM user creation](/guardrails/aws-pb-delegated-user-creation-boundary/). It allows creating or changing users only when the XCompanyBoundaries boundary is applied, and denies editing the boundary policies or deleting a user boundary. AWS notes the delegate can create a user who can reach S3 resources the delegate cannot, so delegation trusts the delegate with that access. Review that trust at least as often as the policy itself.

## Where a boundary fits next to the other mechanisms

A boundary attaches to one user or role, so it fits identities that create other identities. It does not protect a resource from outside callers, which is the [resource control policy](/guides/resource-control-policies/) job, and it does not set a baseline for a whole account, which is the SCP job. Which one to reach for depends on whether the risk is an identity creating identities or a resource reached from outside.

The IAM policy simulator can test one permissions boundary at a time. A boundary change takes effect on every identity that carries it, so simulate the new version before you attach it. [The testing guide](/guides/testing-a-guardrail-before-you-apply-it/) covers how, and the [permissions boundary mechanism page](/mechanisms/permissions-boundary/) lists both library entries. Keep the boundary policy in version control, because a change to the managed policy applies to every identity that carries it.

## Related pages

- [Azure Policy as a guardrail: effects, enforcement mode, exemptions](/guides/azure-policy-as-a-guardrail/)
- [Google Cloud organization policy: constraints, dry-run, IAM deny](/guides/google-cloud-organization-policy/)
- [Preventive vs detective controls: when to block and when to report](/guides/preventive-vs-detective-controls/)
- [All of them](/guides/)

## Sources

- IAM: Permissions boundaries for IAM entities: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- AWS Organizations: Service control policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- IAM: Policy testing with the IAM policy simulator: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_testing-policies.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- AWS Organizations: SCP evaluation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps_evaluation.html (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/guides/permissions-boundaries/
