# Cloud governance tools and the 100 preventive guardrails they put into production, with what each blocks and breaks

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

The library holds 100 preventive guardrails: 40 for AWS, 30 for Azure and 30 for Google Cloud, each copied from provider documentation or a licensed open source set, with what it blocks and what it breaks. Act Security leads the platforms at 5.9, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.7.

- Identity and privilege: 14
- Data exfiltration: 8
- Public exposure: 10
- Logging and monitoring: 8
- Encryption and keys: 13
- Network perimeter: 7
- Region and residency: 5
- Organization integrity: 9
- AI services: 19
- Resource and cost: 7

Scope: security governance, the guardrail layer. Cost governance is out.

## The library by risk class, edition 10 Nov 2026

| Risk class | AWS | Azure | Google Cloud | All |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [Identity and privilege](/risk/identity-and-privilege/) | 7 | 3 | 4 | 14 |
| [Data exfiltration](/risk/data-exfiltration/) | 2 | 1 | 5 | 8 |
| [Public exposure](/risk/public-exposure/) | 4 | 3 | 3 | 10 |
| [Logging and monitoring](/risk/logging-and-monitoring/) | 4 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| [Encryption and keys](/risk/encryption-and-keys/) | 7 | 3 | 3 | 13 |
| [Network perimeter](/risk/network-perimeter/) | 2 | 3 | 2 | 7 |
| [Region and residency](/risk/region-and-residency/) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| [Organization integrity](/risk/organization-integrity/) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
| [AI services](/risk/ai-services/) | 7 | 7 | 5 | 19 |
| [Resource and cost](/risk/resource-and-cost/) | 2 | 3 | 2 | 7 |

100 guardrails. Every entry gives the policy text, what it blocks, what it is known to break and how the provider says to test it first.

- [AWS: 40 guardrails](/library/aws/): Service control policies (SCPs), Resource control policies (RCPs), Declarative policies, IAM permissions boundaries
- [Azure: 30 guardrails](/library/azure/): Azure Policy (built-in definitions), Azure RBAC deny assignments (created by deployment stacks), Azure resource locks, Management group assignment
- [Google Cloud: 30 guardrails](/library/gcp/): Organization Policy Service (managed and legacy constraints), IAM deny policies, VPC Service Controls (service perimeters), Custom organization policy constraints, Principal access boundary (PAB) policies

## Platforms by how safely they put a guardrail into production

| Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (15) | Safe (30) | Class (30) | Fixed (10) | Id+Net+AI (2) | Native (10) | Audit (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.9 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| 2 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.7 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 |
| 3 | [AWS Control Tower](/platforms/aws-control-tower/) | 4.2 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| 4 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.1 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| 5 | [Turbot](/platforms/turbot/) | 3.9 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 |
| 6 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| 7 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.0 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| 8= | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| 8= | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| 10= | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 2.3 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| 10= | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.3 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| 10= | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 2.3 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| 13= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| 13= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| 15 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 1.7 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 16 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 |

One change for a class of risk 30, safe to enforce 30, removes access 15, stays fixed 10, uses the cloud's own controls 10, evidence for auditors 3, identity, network and AI access 2. Scores 0 to 10 from the evidence read 10 Nov 2026; "=" marks a joint rank.

Act is first at 5.9, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.7.

**Where Act is behind.** Act writes guardrails in the provider's own mechanisms and hands them to your pipeline to enforce, so it is bounded by what those mechanisms can express in each cloud. It does not apply them itself, the boundary types it names are AWS's and Azure's, and exception and waiver handling after a guardrail ships was described as roadmap.

## What would change this ranking

Sonrai Security would move ahead of Act Security if its score on safe to enforce rose by 1 point (from 5 to 6) with nothing else changing. A score changes only when a sourced fact changes, and every change is listed on the corrections page.

## The platforms that put a guardrail into production most safely

### Rank 1: Act Security (5.9)
Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7
Highest score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: removes access, 3.
[Read the profile](/platforms/act/)

### Rank 2: Sonrai Security (5.7)
Cloud permissions firewall, One change, a class of risk 7
Highest score: one change, a class of risk, 7 of 10. Lowest: stays fixed, 4.
[Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/)

### Rank 3: AWS Control Tower (4.2)
Provider guardrail service, One change, a class of risk 6
Highest score: one change, a class of risk, 6 of 10. Lowest: safe to enforce, 1.
[Read the profile](/platforms/aws-control-tower/)

### Rank 4: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.1)
Provider tool, Safe to enforce 6
Highest score: safe to enforce, 6 of 10. Lowest: stays fixed, 2.
[Read the profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/)

## Where each is strongest

- **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls.
- **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals.
- **AWS Control Tower:** Control Tower applies preventive (SCP/RCP), detective (AWS Config) and proactive (CloudFormation hook) controls to whole OUs of an AWS landing zone.
- **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made.
- **Turbot:** Guardrails sets a policy once at the root or a folder and corrects drift automatically from cloud change events across AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI and GitHub.
- **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically.
- **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI.
- **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions.
- **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners.
- **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents.
- **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first.
- **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform.
- **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs.
- **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use.
- **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards.
- **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources.

## Picks by situation

- [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/situations/aws-scale/): First: Act Security 5.6; then Sonrai Security 5.5; Act 1st
- [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/situations/multi-cloud/): First: Act Security 5.6; then Sonrai Security 5.5; Act 1st
- [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/situations/ai-agents/): First: Act Security 5.6; then Sonrai Security 5.2; Act 1st
- [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/situations/regulated/): First: Sonrai Security 5.2 (joint with Act Security); Act joint 1st
- [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/situations/small-team/): First: Sonrai Security 5.5 (joint with Act Security); Act joint 1st

## Preventive guardrails

A preventive guardrail is a policy that a cloud evaluates before a request takes effect and answers with a denial. That separates it from a detective control, which reports a violation after the resource exists. A service control policy that denies a leave-organization call, an Azure Policy definition with the deny effect and a Google Cloud organization policy constraint are all preventive. An alert on the same event is not.

Each cloud evaluates its guardrails in a different place. AWS evaluates service control policies and resource control policies together with identity-based and resource-based policies, and the effective permissions are the intersection. Declarative policies work in the service control plane instead. Azure Policy checks create and update requests against assigned definitions. Google Cloud checks IAM deny policies before allow policies, and organization policy constraints, principal access boundaries and VPC Service Controls perimeters each add their own check.

Because a guardrail answers with a denial, its cost is the legitimate work it stops. This library records, for each of 100 entries, what the guardrail blocks and what it breaks, with the source of both. The platforms section ranks sixteen products on how safely they take a guardrail from a draft to production: simulated first, shown against the real environment, and kept in place afterward.

## The Simulation Coverage Matrix

Which platforms show the effect of a guardrail before it is applied, and which provider tools do the same for free: the [Simulation Coverage Matrix](/simulation/) sets the 16 platforms against the native dry-run and simulation methods of the three clouds.

- [The Simulation Coverage Matrix](/simulation/)
- [Every preventive mechanism, per cloud](/mechanisms/)
- [All 100 guardrails](/library/)

## Guides and glossary

- [AWS SCP examples explained: what each pattern blocks and breaks](/guides/aws-scp-examples-explained/)
- [How SCP evaluation works: allow lists, deny lists, and the limits](/guides/how-scp-evaluation-works/)
- [Resource control policies: what RCPs are and how they differ from SCPs](/guides/resource-control-policies/)
- [Permissions boundaries: capping IAM users and roles, and delegation](/guides/permissions-boundaries/)
- [Azure Policy as a guardrail: effects, enforcement mode, exemptions](/guides/azure-policy-as-a-guardrail/)
- [Google Cloud organization policy: constraints, dry-run, IAM deny](/guides/google-cloud-organization-policy/)
- [Glossary, 31 terms](/glossary/)
- [30 questions answered](/faq/)

## Sources

- AWS Organizations: service control policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026)
- act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/
