# Identity and privilege guardrails cap what administrators can do, and break the tasks that need those rights

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

14 guardrails in the library address identity and privilege: 7 AWS, 3 Azure, 4 Google Cloud. The first in the list, "Prevent root credentials management in member accounts", denies all actions for the member account root user unless the session was created with sts:AssumeRoot (the aws:AssumedRoot key is not null), so root credentials are managed centrally from the management account.

Guardrails in this class restrict the root user, IAM user credentials, federation providers and role creation, and set permissions boundaries. The library holds 14, 7 for AWS. They break the work they restrict. Denying the root user except for a few tasks makes every other task done as root in an affected account fail, and the README points to the AWS list of tasks that require root credentials. Denying changes to IAM federation providers blocks teams that manage their own identity providers unless they use the privileged role. A permissions boundary can make an iam:CreateUser call fail because the boundary does not allow the action.

| Guardrail | Cloud | Mechanism | Risk class | Tested first |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [Prevent root credentials management in member accounts](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-member-root-credentials/) | AWS | [Service control policies (SCPs)](/mechanisms/scp/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Deny the root user except for S3 bucket policy changes](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-root-except-s3-bucket-policy/) | AWS | [Service control policies (SCPs)](/mechanisms/scp/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Deny critical IAM user actions](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-critical-iam-user-actions/) | AWS | [Service control policies (SCPs)](/mechanisms/scp/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Deny creating or changing IAM federation providers](/guardrails/aws-scp-deny-iam-federation-changes/) | AWS | [Service control policies (SCPs)](/mechanisms/scp/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Require IMDSv2 for new EC2 instances (declarative policy)](/guardrails/aws-declarative-require-imdsv2/) | AWS | [Declarative policies](/mechanisms/declarative-policy/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Permissions boundary limiting a user to S3, CloudWatch and EC2](/guardrails/aws-pb-restrict-user-to-s3-cloudwatch-ec2/) | AWS | [IAM permissions boundaries](/mechanisms/permissions-boundary/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Permissions boundary for delegated IAM user creation](/guardrails/aws-pb-delegated-user-creation-boundary/) | AWS | [IAM permissions boundaries](/mechanisms/permissions-boundary/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Storage accounts should prevent shared key access](/guardrails/azure-policy-storage-no-shared-key/) | Azure | [Azure Policy (built-in definitions)](/mechanisms/azure-policy/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Azure Key Vault should use the RBAC permission model](/guardrails/azure-policy-keyvault-use-rbac/) | Azure | [Azure Policy (built-in definitions)](/mechanisms/azure-policy/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Azure SQL Database should have Microsoft Entra-only authentication enabled](/guardrails/azure-policy-sql-entra-only/) | Azure | [Azure Policy (built-in definitions)](/mechanisms/azure-policy/) | Identity and privilege | documented |
| [Disable service account key creation](/guardrails/gcp-orgpolicy-disable-sa-key-creation/) | Google Cloud | [Organization Policy Service (managed and legacy constraints)](/mechanisms/org-policy/) | Identity and privilege | none found |
| [Disable automatic IAM grants for default service accounts](/guardrails/gcp-orgpolicy-no-auto-iam-grants-default-sa/) | Google Cloud | [Organization Policy Service (managed and legacy constraints)](/mechanisms/org-policy/) | Identity and privilege | none found |
| [Require OS Login](/guardrails/gcp-orgpolicy-require-os-login/) | Google Cloud | [Organization Policy Service (managed and legacy constraints)](/mechanisms/org-policy/) | Identity and privilege | none found |
| [Deny service account key create and delete to a group on one project](/guardrails/gcp-deny-service-account-key-admin/) | Google Cloud | [IAM deny policies](/mechanisms/iam-deny/) | Identity and privilege | documented |

"Tested first" says whether the provider documents a way to see the guardrail's effect before enforcing it. Read 10 Nov 2026.

## What these guardrails break

- **Prevent root credentials management in member accounts** (AWS): Direct root user sign-in in a member account can no longer perform actions; the repository README notes the SCP restricts the member account root user and has no effect on the management account.
- **Deny the root user except for S3 bucket policy changes** (AWS): Any other task done as the root user in an affected account fails; the README points to the AWS list of tasks that require root user credentials.
- **Deny critical IAM user actions** (AWS): Anyone outside the named privileged role or tag exception cannot create or rotate IAM user credentials, and the placeholder [PRIVILEGED_ROLE] must be replaced before use.
- **Deny creating or changing IAM federation providers** (AWS): Teams that manage their own identity providers in member accounts are blocked unless they use the privileged role; the README says it is usually paired with the critical IAM user actions policy.
- **Require IMDSv2 for new EC2 instances (declarative policy)** (AWS): AWS says to make sure no instances are making IMDSv1 calls before setting http_tokens to required, and recommends a hop limit of at least 2 when it is required.
- **Permissions boundary limiting a user to S3, CloudWatch and EC2** (AWS): AWS gives the example of an iam:CreateUser permission policy failing because the boundary does not allow the action.
- **Permissions boundary for delegated IAM user creation** (AWS): AWS notes the delegated administrator can create a user who can access S3 resources the administrator cannot, so delegating effectively trusts the administrator with that access.
- **Storage accounts should prevent shared key access** (Azure): Existing storage accounts that allow Shared Key are marked non-compliant but not changed.
- **Azure Key Vault should use the RBAC permission model** (Azure): Existing key vaults on access policies are marked non-compliant but not changed.
- **Azure SQL Database should have Microsoft Entra-only authentication enabled** (Azure): The definition does not block servers from being created with local authentication enabled; Microsoft points to the Entra-only authentication initiative to cover both.
- **Disable service account key creation** (Google Cloud): Google documents that user-managed credentials cannot be created for service accounts in affected projects, so tools or workloads that depend on newly created keys cannot get them.
- **Disable automatic IAM grants for default service accounts** (Google Cloud): Google documents that it does not stop the Editor or Owner role being granted to default service accounts later, and that other roles must be granted instead of Editor.
- **Require OS Login** (Google Cloud): Google documents that setting OS Login metadata deletes the VM authorized_keys files and VMs no longer accept SSH keys stored in project or instance metadata.
- **Deny service account key create and delete to a group on one project** (Google Cloud): Google documents that a denied principal cannot use the permission whatever roles they hold, so an exception group (exceptionPrincipals) is needed for anyone who must keep the access.

**Where Act is behind.** Act writes guardrails in the provider's own mechanisms and hands them to your pipeline to enforce, so it is bounded by what those mechanisms can express in each cloud. It does not apply them itself, the boundary types it names are AWS's and Azure's, and exception and waiver handling after a guardrail ships was described as roadmap.

## Related pages

- [Data exfiltration: 8 preventive guardrails across three clouds](/risk/data-exfiltration/)
- [Public exposure: 10 preventive guardrails across three clouds](/risk/public-exposure/)
- [Logging and monitoring: 8 preventive guardrails across three clouds](/risk/logging-and-monitoring/)

## Sources

- Prevent root credentials management in member accounts: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aws-samples/service-control-policy-examples/main/Privileged-access-controls/Prevent-root-credentials-management-in-member-accounts-in-AWS-Organizations.json (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Deny the root user except for S3 bucket policy changes: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aws-samples/service-control-policy-examples/main/Privileged-access-controls/Deny-the-root-user-from-performing-actions-except-S3-bucketpolicy-changes.json (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Deny critical IAM user actions: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aws-samples/service-control-policy-examples/main/Privileged-access-controls/Deny-critical-IAM-user-actions.json (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Deny creating or changing IAM federation providers: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aws-samples/service-control-policy-examples/main/Privileged-access-controls/Deny-unwarranted-IAM-federations-creation-modification.json (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Require IMDSv2 for new EC2 instances (declarative policy): https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_ec2_syntax.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Permissions boundary limiting a user to S3, CloudWatch and EC2: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Permissions boundary for delegated IAM user creation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Storage accounts should prevent shared key access: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/azure-policy/master/built-in-policies/policyDefinitions/Storage/StorageAccountAllowSharedKeyAccess_Audit.json (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/risk/identity-and-privilege/
