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Public exposure guardrails close the open door, and existing resources often stay open

10 guardrails in the library address public exposure: 4 AWS, 3 Azure, 3 Google Cloud. The first in the list, "Deny disabling block public access for AMIs", denies ec2:DisableImageBlockPublicAccess so Block public access for AMIs cannot be turned off. Each entry gives the policy text, what it blocks, what it is known to break and how to test it first.

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Guardrails in this class keep resources off the public internet: public blob access, public IPs, open function URLs, unauthenticated identity pools. The library holds 10. Their typical cost is to applications that relied on the open setting. In AWS, requiring IAM authentication on Lambda function URLs blocks any function URL with auth type NONE, and denying unauthenticated Cognito access ends guest credentials. Their typical gap is the resources that already exist: Azure marks an existing network interface with a public IP as noncompliant but does not change it, and Google says its Cloud SQL public IP constraint is not retroactive.

What these guardrails break

  • Deny disabling block public access for AMIs (AWS): The README notes the default for the setting depends on whether the account is new or existing and whether it has public AMIs; the policy has no exception condition.
  • Require IAM authentication on Lambda function URLs (AWS): Function URLs with auth type NONE can no longer be created or updated in the affected accounts.
  • Deny changes to S3 Block Public Access at bucket level (AWS): No principal, including bucket owners, can change bucket-level Block Public Access settings; the README says S3 policies are recommended over an RCP for this control.
  • Deny unauthenticated access to Cognito identity pools (AWS): Applications that rely on guest access to an identity pool can no longer obtain credentials; only authenticated users can.
  • Network interfaces should not have public IPs (Azure): Existing network interfaces that already have a public IP are marked non-compliant but not changed.
  • Configure storage accounts to disallow public blob access (Azure): Modify rewrites the property during create or update instead of rejecting the request, and existing storage accounts change only through a remediation task.
  • Storage accounts should disable public network access (Azure): The documented effect of the setting is that it denies all logins that match IP or virtual network-based firewall rules.
  • Enforce public access prevention on Cloud Storage (Google Cloud): Google documents that it overrides existing public permissions and revokes public access for existing buckets and objects once enabled.
  • Restrict public IP access on Cloud SQL instances (Google Cloud): Google documents that the constraint is not retroactive: instances with existing Public IP access keep working.
  • Define allowed external IPs for VM instances (Google Cloud): Google documents that it does not restrict the use of IPv6 addresses.

Where Act is behind

Act writes guardrails in the provider's own mechanisms and hands them to your pipeline to enforce, so it is bounded by what those mechanisms can express in each cloud. It does not apply them itself, the boundary types it names are AWS's and Azure's, and exception and waiver handling after a guardrail ships was described as roadmap.

Sources

  1. Deny disabling block public access for AMIs, read 10 Nov 2026
  2. Require IAM authentication on Lambda function URLs, read 10 Nov 2026
  3. Deny changes to S3 Block Public Access at bucket level, read 10 Nov 2026
  4. Deny unauthenticated access to Cognito identity pools, read 10 Nov 2026
  5. Network interfaces should not have public IPs, read 10 Nov 2026
  6. Configure storage accounts to disallow public blob access, read 10 Nov 2026
  7. Storage accounts should disable public network access, read 10 Nov 2026
  8. Enforce public access prevention on Cloud Storage, read 10 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.