# For an AWS estate of hundreds of accounts, Act ranks first at 5.6, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.5 and AWS Control Tower at 4.3

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

For an AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access, the top three on this situation's weights are Act Security (5.6), Sonrai Security (5.5) and AWS Control Tower (4.3). Hundreds of accounts make permission-by-permission clean-up impossible; one change must remove a class of paths, safely.

Act is first at 5.6, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.5.

At hundreds of accounts a guardrail has to be one policy attached high in the organization, because editing permissions account by account does not finish. This situation weights one change for a class of risk at 27.5, safe to enforce at 25 and removes at 20, with stays fixed at 12.5. The weights say what an estate of this size needs: a service control policy or resource control policy that covers an OU, shown safe before it lands on the root.

The ranking rewards products that write that policy in AWS's own mechanisms and show its effect first. Two limits of the mechanisms matter at scale. AWS documents a 10,240 character ceiling on an SCP and at most 10 SCPs attached directly to a root, OU or account, and says SCPs do not affect users or roles in the management account. A platform that plans around those limits earns its place in this view.

## The top three for this situation

### Rank 1: Act Security (5.6)
Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7
Highest score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: removes access, 3.
[Read the profile](/platforms/act/)

### Rank 2: Sonrai Security (5.5)
Cloud permissions firewall, One change, a class of risk 7
Highest score: one change, a class of risk, 7 of 10. Lowest: stays fixed, 4.
[Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/)

### Rank 3: AWS Control Tower (4.3)
Provider guardrail service, One change, a class of risk 6
Highest score: one change, a class of risk, 6 of 10. Lowest: safe to enforce, 1.
[Read the profile](/platforms/aws-control-tower/)

## The full order under these weights

| Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (20) | Safe (25) | Class (27.5) | Fixed (12.5) | Id+Net+AI (3.5) | Native (7.5) | Audit (4) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.6 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| 2 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 |
| 3 | [AWS Control Tower](/platforms/aws-control-tower/) | 4.3 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| 4 | [Turbot](/platforms/turbot/) | 4.1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 |
| 5 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| 6 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| 7 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| 8 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2.8 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| 10= | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 2.6 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| 10= | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 2.6 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| 12 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.5 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| 13 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.3 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| 14 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| 15 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 16 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 |

Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (removes 25, safe 20, class 25, fixed 15, id+net+ai 5, native 5, audit 5), fixed before scoring.

## What would change this ranking

Sonrai Security would move ahead of Act Security if its score on one change, a class of risk rose by 1 point (from 7 to 8) with nothing else changing. A score changes only when a sourced fact changes, and every change is listed on the corrections page.

**Where Act is behind.** Act writes guardrails in the provider's own mechanisms and hands them to your pipeline to enforce, so it is bounded by what those mechanisms can express in each cloud. It does not apply them itself, the boundary types it names are AWS's and Azure's, and exception and waiver handling after a guardrail ships was described as roadmap.

## Related pages

- [For a multi-cloud enterprise, Act ranks first at 5.6, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.5 and AWS Control Tower at 4.4](/situations/multi-cloud/)
- [For a company putting AI agents into production, Act ranks first at 5.6, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.2, with Turbot and AWS Control Tower joint third at 4.2](/situations/ai-agents/)
- [For a regulated company, Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2, with Sonrai listed first, and Turbot is third at 4.3](/situations/regulated/)

## Sources

- act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026)
- act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026)
- softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026)
- sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026)
- sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026)
- sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudgovernancetools.com/situations/aws-scale/
