Data exfiltration guardrails stop sharing and exports, and they break legitimate sharing
Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
8 guardrails in the library address data exfiltration: 2 AWS, 1 Azure, 5 Google Cloud. The first in the list, "Deny AWS RAM sharing with external accounts", denies ram:CreateResourceShare and ram:UpdateResourceShare when the share allows external principals. Each entry gives the policy text, what it blocks, what it is known to break and how to test it first.
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Guardrails in this class stop data from leaving the organization: resource sharing with outside accounts, public snapshots, long-lived access tokens, exports to outside destinations and service perimeters. The library holds 8 of them, 5 for Google Cloud. What they break is legitimate sharing. In AWS, denying RAM sharing with external accounts makes sharing a subnet fail for every principal in the affected accounts. In Google Cloud, domain restricted sharing needs your own organization principal set and Google Workspace ID listed, or your own principals cannot be granted roles. Google also says moves within an organization are not governed by the export constraint.
What these guardrails break
- Deny AWS RAM sharing with external accounts (AWS): Sharing resources such as VPC subnets with accounts outside the organization fails for every principal in the affected accounts.
- Block public sharing of EBS snapshots (declarative policy) (AWS): AWS documents that snapshots already publicly shared remain publicly available under block_new_sharing, and EnableSnapshotBlockPublicAccess and DisableSnapshotBlockPublicAccess cannot be used to change the enforced setting.
- Storage SAS tokens should adhere to 7 day maximum validity (Azure): Existing storage accounts with longer SAS lifetimes are marked non-compliant but not changed.
- Domain restricted sharing (Google Cloud): Google documents that the organization principal set and Google Workspace ID are not automatically allowed, so they must be listed to let your own principals be granted roles.
- Service perimeter around managed services (Google Cloud): Google documents that a VM in a VPC network inside the perimeter cannot reach Cloud Storage buckets outside it, and that ingress or egress rules are needed for any cross-perimeter access.
- Allowed destinations for exporting resources (Google Cloud): Google documents that moves within an organization are not governed by this constraint, and that the move still needs the usual IAM permissions.
- Custom constraint limiting IAM role grants to organization members (Google Cloud): Google documents that with the ALLOW action every case not explicitly listed in the condition is blocked, so any other member type in an allow policy is refused.
- Principal access boundary limiting the resources principals can access (Google Cloud): Google documents that a policy only blocks permissions in its enforcement version, so an access attempt using a permission it cannot block is not stopped.
Where Act is behind
Act writes guardrails in the provider's own mechanisms and hands them to your pipeline to enforce, so it is bounded by what those mechanisms can express in each cloud. It does not apply them itself, the boundary types it names are AWS's and Azure's, and exception and waiver handling after a guardrail ships was described as roadmap.
Related pages
Sources
- Deny AWS RAM sharing with external accounts, read 10 Nov 2026
- Block public sharing of EBS snapshots (declarative policy), read 10 Nov 2026
- Storage SAS tokens should adhere to 7 day maximum validity, read 10 Nov 2026
- Domain restricted sharing, read 10 Nov 2026
- Service perimeter around managed services, read 10 Nov 2026
- Allowed destinations for exporting resources, read 10 Nov 2026
- Custom constraint limiting IAM role grants to organization members, read 10 Nov 2026
- Principal access boundary limiting the resources principals can access, read 10 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.